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Introduction
The micro-level empirical approach to civil war seeks to better under-
stand the dynamics of recruitment and participation of youth in armed 
groups.1 In this literature, as shown in Figure 1, the recruitment of adult 
and child combatants is often based on a combination of reasons. These 
can be categorized as a compendium of "push" and "pull" factors, ranging 
Abstract
In the complex of motivating variables that define the push and pull fac-
tors behind recruitment and participation in civil conflict, "radicaliza-
tion"—or "violent extremism"—is not conceived as a very strong motive, 
as is the case with studies on terrorism. As part of disarming youth com-
batants, the linkages between reintegration outcomes and possible re-
recruitment into radical and extremist violence must be better under-
stood to mitigate such risks. In our analysis, the policies guiding reinte-
gration of child soldiers and youth should be better attuned to the 
relationship between recruitment motivations and reintegration out-
comes, and must be approached from a political lens rather than a purely 
technical one. The risk of radicalization and involvement in violent 
extremism is ultimately a structural challenge, which needs to address 
root causes of recruitment rather than trying to find a solution through a 
band-aid approach of stopgap reintegration assistance.
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from environment, structural violence, coercion, poverty, education and 
employment, family and friends, politics and ideology, to culture and tra-
dition. Culturally, being a soldier may be traditionally coveted, and join-
ing the military a much desired career. In some instances, youth may 
volunteer to avenge the death of a close family member or to defend their 
community. Children and adults may also join armed groups to bring 
back food or other material goods to support their families. Violence and 
the symbolic power of the gun can become a source of authority over par-
ents and elders, reconfiguring the need for obedience, compliance, and 
respect that for generations has been inculcated into youth to perpetuate 
a gerontocratic hierarchy. Nonetheless, in this complex of motivating 
variables "radicalization"—or "violent extremism"—is not conceived as a 
very strong motive for youth recruitment, as is the case with studies on 
terrorism.
Within the context of violent extremism, Islamic radicalization in Europe, 
the threat of terrorism, and changing demographic trends in European 
cities due to a steady flow of immigrants have been at the center of aca-
demic and policy attention in recent years.2 Increasingly, there have been 
efforts at interpreting the Koran to generate a tailored genealogy of radi-
calization. These have imparted a specific Islamic flavor to political vio-
lence, especially among youth. Right-wing radicalism in Norway, which 
was witnessed in the gruesome shooting of teenagers at the political camp 
of the ruling party, is a chilling testament to the variants of radicalism 
existing in the West. Hence, Islamic radicalism, while it has been at the 
center of much political and policy interest, may not be the only source of 
radicalized violence that threatens Western society.
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Figure 1: Participation Pathways in Civil Conflict
In Southeast Asia, the 2009 suicide bombings in Jakarta by two Indone-
sian youths, Dani Dwi Permana and Nana Ikhwana Maulana, fall into the 
broader mold of terrorist recruitment and radicalization by organized 
outfits such as Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah in the region. Separat-
ist groups, such as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), the Organisasi 
Pembebasan Papua (OPM), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) also use religious appeals to motivate participation. The role of 
charismatic and influential leadership in recruiting youth is also critical.3
The U.S. National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, Mapping the Glo-
bal Future, has reported a strong incidence of youth bulges in Arab states 
and growing radicalization of this demographic group.4 This has also 
been an increasing trend among Muslim diaspora communities in the 
United States.5 Low levels of education as well as stunted access to socio-
economic improvement have exacerbated this phenomenon in fragile pol-
ities such as Pakistan. The majority of radicalized youth in such countries 
are motivated to join violent organizations due to feelings of alienation 
from larger society, and as a function of socio-economic deprivation.6
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Radical tendencies are closely identified with the idea of extremism, 
which in turn is aimed at unprecedented social overhaul. Given the skills 
that youth combatants have in the security sector, the ex-combatants can 
be important recruits for transnational terrorist organizations. Hence dis-
armament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policy needs to 
address this vulnerability, particularly in the context of regional instabil-
ity and the interconnectedness of modern conflicts. The phenomenon of 
recidivism has been well-documented in the South Asian and West Afri-
can regions and may hold true for the Middle East in its current turmoil. 
Civilian unrest in response to years of authoritarian regimes has 
unleashed a new mode of social protest, which has important implications 
for DDR practice. Therefore, this paper undertakes a conceptual scoping 
of interrelationships between disarming child soldiers and rehabilitating 
youth engaged in radical protest or violent extremism.
Our main argument here is that current DDR approaches are oblivious to 
the linkage between reintegration outcomes and re-recruitment into vio-
lent extremism. Although there is much effort to break chains of com-
mand, regional security architecture in countries like Afghanistan and 
Pakistan is complex. The borders are porous, and DDR programs pay 
mere lip service to the overwhelming challenge of security.
Push and Pull Factors in Recruitment of 
Youth into Conflict
From a micro-economics lens, material recruitment incentives offered by 
rebellious organizations for youth are relatively weak. Youth often require 
less money and do not receive a big share of the looted items, and this is 
due to their dependence on senior commanders for protection, patronage, 
and support. Their affiliational bonding with the group and its leadership 
flows essentially from feelings of protection, security, and non-pecuniary 
rewards, such as honor and duty, revenge, a sense of purpose, or protec-
tion from violence.7 Hence, armed groups with few or limited resources 
forcibly recruit young adolescents because they offer the optimal combi-
nation of effectiveness and ease of retention.8 Some of the underlying 
variables of child soldiering which lend greater nuance to grasping the 
scope and extent of the problem pertain to the nature of conflicts (high or 
low intensity, cross-border or internal), the patterns and nature of 
recruitment (seeking food, security, or employment; seeking revenge; 
being encouraged by family or community; or forced abduction), as well 
as the experiences of the children (being involved in active fighting, sexual 
exploitation, their role being valorized, or their experience featuring 
abuse).9 In fact, children serving as a new pool of military labor have 
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raised issues within the domain of labor economics—in particular, how 
involuntary military service provided by abducted children impacts the 
labor market.10
There also exists a need to disaggregate between direct experiences of 
participation and the over-arching risks to which children in armed 
conflict zones are exposed. Strang et al. allude to the presence of a 
mixture of discrete risks, including attack and displacement, and chronic 
risks, such as poverty and lack of access to regular schooling and health 
care.11 In order to mitigate their impacts, Kostelny offers a risk-
accumulation model to structure the challenge facing children in conflict 
and post-conflict situations.12 The model includes emotional, social, 
spiritual, and physical impacts on children and youth, while levels of both 
risk and the impact of conflict are ordered along three significant points, 
namely the family, community, and society.
At the level of family, children witness the loss of loved ones, separation 
from family units, or a lack of care on account of the exigencies of war 
zones. At the level of community, abduction and coercive recruitment in 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Uganda, among other cases, have established a 
trend where children have been captured and forced to attack their neigh-
bors and commit atrocities against their own kith and kin, disrupting 
social relations, breeding mistrust, and creating enormous problems for 
the eventual return to the community. At the societal level, agency factors 
become important. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, for instance, the civil con-
flicts were in part a product of youth marginalization, patrimonialism, 
and power monopolization in the hands of a few "big men." Social ine-
quality, injustice, and lack of social mobility resulted from this exclusion-
ism and fueled dissent.13
Radicalization
Radicalization is a key theme in terrorism discourses and is well 
documented in recent literature on youth and politics.14 Radicalization 
has been approached as a psycho-social process of gradual progress from 
context, to thought, and finally to action. Hence, it requires micro 
(individual) and macro (societal/cultural) examination of context-specific 
variables to explain causation.15 Concepts of radicalism and terrorism are 
often conflated; in our understanding, the term radicalization refers to 
the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs. Ideological 
advocacy for racial or religious supremacy and opposition to the 
egalitarian principles of democracy mark radical thought and action. 
These processes are closely related to participation or action pathways, 
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namely the process of engaging in terrorism or violent extremist actions. 
Some of the push-and-pull factors identified as central to youth 
recruitment in civil conflict are also relevant to engagement in violent 
extremism.
In the case of child soldiers, joining an armed group as an act of agency 
and volition is underplayed in contemporary popular accounts of child 
recruitment. However, joining either the rebel group or the government 
forces in a contested territory can become the only route to survival, offer-
ing protection from torture, abuse, and politically instigated killings. In 
other cases, family and community itself can be important agents by 
encouraging enrollment as part of military culture, which may be embed-
ded in local concepts of community defense. In many communities, ado-
lescent youth play a critical role in communal defense, one that is 
expected as an essential and natural part of their transition into adult-
hood. In a few instances, joining a faction could aid in family reunifica-
tion, especially in a countryside characterized by roaming and raiding 
"soldier men." Arming oneself with a weapon improves the chances of 
successful attempts to locate and rescue estranged family. Additionally, 
controlling the deployment of violence assists in movement and provides 
access to public services when official facilities have ceased. Invoking a 
community approach can identify risk factors to child recruitment. While 
these triggers are built into the structure of conflicts, it is also important 
to address the resilience and coping mechanisms that youth are supposed 
to learn with age that provide important capacities to avoid recruitment.
The role of the family and community is often a critical factor in the nor-
mative development of youth and their involvement in extremism. 
Recruitment into violent extremism may involve radicalization and sub-
sequent recruitment. Some debate exists among contemporary scholars, 
however, about the nature and extent of terrorist recruitment, at least as it 
relates to militant jihad. Established patterns of recruitment have not 
been reported for organizations like al-Qaida. Voluntary enlistment, at 
times mediated through kin relationships or immediate family, is the key 
mode of participation for "militants." Traditional recruitment patterns, 
such as conscription or dedicated military service, do not seem to be the 
norm in such organizations. Islamist militants seek new supporters, activ-
ists, and members that they engage in active efforts; this pattern influ-
ences others to adopt their point of view.16
Exposure to conflict, coupled with the lack of a strong family or commu-
nity, can be key factors for children to participate in violence. This is often 
the case when combatants experienced maltreatment of factions directly 
or indirectly, or have lost family members in a protracted conflict. These 
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issues of grief and grievances can cumulatively encourage, or enhance, the 
propensity on the part of youth to join an armed group. Lack of access to 
socio-economic opportunities, especially being in a situation of chronic 
poverty, can make involvement in extremism a way out of social margin-
ality. In certain circumstances, poverty-induced marginality may be rein-
forced by a lure of ideology, especially when recruiters harp on 
perceptions and experiences of injustice. This has been the case in several 
conflicts, such as Colombia, Nepal, and in India's Maoist affected states.
Direct and indirect benefits deriving from participation are an important 
issue in the recruitment of combatants, particularly in environments 
where conflict has a strong characteristic of greed and clientelism. In the 
first instance, it might not seem to be too relevant for the involvement in 
extremism, but a "martyr" who fought with a group such as Hezbollah can 
bring many kudos and direct benefits to the family. This sense of social 
status and contribution to an important cause in conflicts where self-
sacrifice to a nationalist or religious cause can merit respect, or even 
divinity, can also influence the decision of youth and their family towards 
participation in radical violence.
Most of the literature on radicalization into violent extremist ideologies 
(particularly those that support terrorism) is conceptual, rather than 
empirical.17 While the exact sequence of these changes is debatable, dif-
ferent pathways and mechanisms operate for different people. A more 
nuanced understanding of how this process operates, both between and 
within groups, will enable us to develop more informed policies and prac-
tices to mitigate and prevent the propagation of violent extremism.
There are many possible theoretical-analytic frameworks that might be 
applied to the radicalization process. Crossett and Spitaletta identify six-
teen theories that have been proposed to explain the causal chain leading 
to radicalization.18 Prominent among these are social-movement theory, 
social psychology, and conversion theory. These operate at both the 
macro and micro levels. Yet there is little investigation into the dimension 
of how negative reintegration outcomes for former child soldiers may 
encourage their radicalization and subsequent recruitment into violent 
extremism. We explore this theme further.
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Reintegration Outcomes and the Problem of 
Radicalization or Re-recruitment into Violent 
Extremism
Apart from the recruitment pathways and motivations discussed above, 
the successes and failures in the reintegration of former combatants and 
child soldiers also play a significant role in their possible radicalization 
and participation in violent extremism. Group socialization can be a 
powerful mechanism for changing the identities of young people, and 
thus transforming children into soldiers. This has important implications 
for post-conflict civilian life, especially with respect to the challenges of 
regaining lost childhoods, family, loved ones, and norms of social 
behavior. In long conflicts, such as those in Guatemala, Sierra Leone, and 
Liberia, members who join as children and demobilize as adults suffer 
from long-term in-group socialization. This socialization has important 
consequences for post-war reintegration outcomes because it impinges on 
some key post-war behavioral indicators with respect to mental-health-
related disorders, such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
disability, and reproductive atrophy. Apart from medical problems, the 
loss of education, a lack of employable skills, and the destruction of a 
stable family life are all important negative fallouts from a life spent in an 
armed group.
Becoming a soldier marks a transition away from the normal and 
accepted; hence, returning to a prior set of rules can be a significant chal-
lenge. Traditional interventions, involving ritualistic cleansing and sacri-
fice in societies with strong communitarian visions of death, illness, and 
healing can help to create a socially acceptable return. Traditional cleans-
ing rituals, such as the organic interventions witnessed in Mozambique 
can be critical for the onset of reintegration processes. They are meant to 
spiritually realign well-being with the social world and discard identities 
and habits imbibed in the fighters' world.
What are the options for re-socializing children from their soldier iden-
tity? Present approaches to reintegration seem to overlook the impor-
tance of process and do not emphasize the social elements of 
reintegration. A return to the norms and values of pre-conflict society can 
undermine efforts to engender greater acceptability. Reintegrating com-
batants experience an inversion of values, in which killing, amputation, 
and other forms of horrific violence are no longer desirable. What had 
become accepted forms of behavior during war are considered reprehen-
sible in peace-time, which undermines the sense of identity and courage 
that youth had created as fighters. There are "good" and "bad" rebels, in 
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some respects. Distrust and fear of child soldiers are common in civilian 
communities, even years after war ends. It is difficult to discard rebel-like 
behavior and to reorient oneself to the reality, poverty, or incapacity of 
civilian living.
At the same time, child soldiers remain in some respect victims of their 
past. Violence is an entrenched reality of their lives, and it is the most 
destructive element since reliance on violence to secure what in a free 
society can be secured institutionally or rightfully, remains a key chal-
lenge in the identity transformation process. In some contexts, organic 
approaches, especially traditional cleansing ceremonies, have helped 
repair relationships with their families and communities in order to 
realign their well-being with spiritual beliefs of death and rebirth. Such 
ritualistic rebirth and cleansing eases return and enhances community 
trust in its own youth, who are perceived as spiritually polluted through 
exposure to violence and death during war-time. This element of success-
ful social reintegration and re-acceptance by their families and communi-
ties needs to be emphasized as a preventive mechanism for re-
recruitment into violent extremism.
At a more technical level, with respect to DDR efforts, child soldiers have 
traditionally been excluded from DDR programs and reintegration sup-
port in particular. Efforts at stopgap programs have targeted these 
excluded youth by giving them priority in family reunification, counsel-
ing, basic economic assistance in the form of short vocational training 
programs, and provision for shelter, food, and tools. Community-based 
reintegration (CBR) strategies attempted in the context of child soldier 
reintegration seem better poised to tackle the need for balance in target-
ing and mitigating animosities stemming from exclusive focus on any par-
ticular caseload.
The preventive capacity of communities is central to discouraging re-
recruitment into violent extremism. The criticism of CBR approaches as 
relegating responsibility for reintegration to impoverished and incapaci-
tated communities is underlined; however, the positives of this strategy 
lie in ensuring community-located follow-up mechanisms and more effec-
tive use of donor and local resources. If communities are provided ade-
quate resources and get support from the state and central government, 
and if they are able to identify, gauge and prioritize needs locally, then 
they will be able to respond to those needs more effectively. It is vital that 
credence is paid to building this capacity. Children benefit from returning 
to an environment that encourages them to lead a normal life, to return to 
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education, and witness stability. The primary challenge here is positively 
engaging a rich pool of human resources for development, rather than re-
marginalizing child soldiers.
The angle of power and agency in youth participation, and ways in which 
post-conflict reintegration strategies impact elements of individual action 
and trajectories of empowerment, is a topic for further investigation. 
Social navigation can be understood as motion within a fluid space, and it 
requires individual agency in deciding on how to navigate the dangers and 
the possibilities, as well as an ability to locate and creatively traverse a dif-
ficult social space. Social navigation and post-conflict power are an 
important yet little understood dimension in the reintegration trajectories 
of child soldiers. At the same time, the implications of DDR and reintegra-
tion outcomes on radicalization and involvement in violent extremism 
need to be mulled in greater depth.
In post-conflict societies, child soldiers are susceptible to 
disempowerment, marginalization, and a return to erstwhile structures of 
traditional leadership, control, and domination. How do youth negotiate 
this sudden change in status? The loss of education, a lack of 
employment, and the pejorative label of child soldier makes successful 
reintegration a difficult challenge. At the same time, where then does 
reintegration support figure into the process? And more importantly, 
what can it do for youth returning to their dilapidated communities? 
Support can be directed towards individual child soldiers themselves, or it 
can help those who seek to develop infrastructure by allocating funds to 
schools for the benefit of children in the community as a whole. One of the 
lessons drawn from recent reintegration experiences in Nepal and Sudan 
is that instead of providing comprehensive reintegration packages for 
individual child soldiers, it is important to locate that support in the 
family and community, thus creating and enabling an empowered 
environment for the reintegration of returning child soldiers.
In light of the complicated matrix which informs reintegration success, 
youths' re-engagement into violence in the post-war period can be moti-
vated by a combination of factors. These may range from a certain loss of 
agency, victimization, and revenge attacks to issues of physical and eco-
nomic insecurity. Grievances or a feeling of exclusion, i.e., lack of access 
to education, lack of employment, trauma, and political and social mar-
ginalization, are important motivations for recruitment and also explain 
re-recruitment triggers. In the absence of physical security, former sol-
diers who continue to feel isolated and unintegrated resort to violence in 
an attempt to solve their problems.19 With few avenues for social 
advancement in post-conflict contexts plagued by gerontocratic and cor-
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rupt societies, war often becomes a plausible route to empowerment, 
especially for marginalized groups such as male youth.20 This was the 
case in Algeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.21 When in the aftermath of 
peace processes young demobilized soldiers found themselves reintegrat-
ing into poverty, or into a similar situation of political, economic, and 
social marginalization as experienced in the pre-war period, many 
returned to combat as mercenaries in regional conflicts.22 Also, in several 
conflicts like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Uganda, child soldiers brutalized 
their own communities, at times under the orders of superiors, with the 
view of burning their bridges with family and the home environment. 
Others were directed to raid their own villages, loot food, mutilate people, 
or even kill their own relatives.
The instrumental and technical emphasis of DDR remains focused on 
numbers, caseloads, targets, partners, trauma, protection, and rehabilita-
tion. These only superficially address the underlying cause of conflicts 
and incompletely contribute to reintegration success. DDR approaches 
remain mired in instrumentalism; the means and end results are instru-
mental and are geared towards keeping a certain caseload perceived as a 
"security threat" busy and engaged to prevent conflict relapse. Besides, 
there are significant negative impacts of DDR programs for child soldiers. 
They can result in labeling, stigma, distrust, and animosity at an inter-
group level within rural communities.
A critical focus of DDR policy should be towards engaging youth in 
leadership structures to enable continued engagement of young people in 
socio-political ventures and positive peace building. This aspect can help 
mitigate potential radicalization or re-recruitment. Successful socio-
economic reintegration can help weaken command and control 
structures, given that former commanders can be potential recruiters for 
violent extremist activities. In countries where DDR programs have been 
successful, new social relationships forged through training and schooling 
have encouraged youth to think strategically and opt for civilian 
livelihoods instead of re-engaging in violence. This underlines the need 
for addressing the push and pull factors which motivate recruitment in 
the first place. The persistence of inequalities, grievances, and a return to 
poverty creates a disappointment with conflict participation and a sense 
of loss, which might encourage susceptibility to radical ideologies.
This overview of the correlation between reintegration outcomes and re-
recruitment directs towards the following recommendations. First of all, 
the main policy focus on preventing re-recruitment must be a combina-
tion of comprehensive reintegration benefits rooted in community-based 
support structures, effective border monitoring, and the creation of politi-
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cal and social leadership opportunities for youth, thereby undermining 
their possible exclusion, and thus re-marginalization. Second, it is impor-
tant to monitor sites of re-recruitment, such as ex-combatant communi-
ties or settlements, which have higher ex-combatant populations. These 
locations are a common feature of many post-conflict countries, where 
familiarity and war-time social networks persist and dictate resettlement 
preferences. Similarly, camps for displaced populations are also potent 
sites for re-recruitment, and thus need to be monitored effectively. The 
ultimate goal is to return displaced people and reunite them with their 
families and home communities. Finally, the presence of radical groups or 
regional terror networks can also provide the contextual possibilities for 
re-recruitment, and these need to be undermined by political and devel-
opment actors.
Conclusion
Those faced with the task of reintegration often confront the ultimate 
question of "reintegration into what," as this process exposes the most 
significant assumption made by DDR programs, which is the existence of 
a "home" and "community." This is particularly significant for young 
combatants and child soldiers because their normative years were spent 
within the structures of an armed group. The idea of going back "home" is 
often not more than an illusion. However, it is through this illusion that 
many young combatants are expected to go through the major identity 
transformation process from combatant to re-integrated civilian in a post-
conflict environment. Consequently, behind the disguise of reintegration, 
many young people with violent pasts are left to their own devices to 
rebuild a new life. Some of them indeed do build a new life, but some 
struggle and fail. Considering that the way DDR of youth and child sol-
diers takes place in highly damaged, polarized, and fragile socio-economic 
and political environments of war-torn societies, those who fail in finding 
a place for themselves in the post-conflict society are left at the mercy of 
gangs, criminal networks, and radical groups for re-recruitment.
Former youth combatants tend to be a major legacy of conflicts, left 
behind as a further threat to the security of society. Both for micro-
insecurity, in terms of their involvement in crime and violence at the local 
level, and macro-insecurity, in terms of similar involvement in the 
international arena, the failures in reintegration can lead to recruitment 
into radical groups. However, to understand this relationship better it is 
important to fully consider the "pull and push" factors that were discussed 
at the beginning of this paper. The re-recruitment of former child soldiers 
would rely on similar push and pull factors, but the agency of "former 
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combatant" here requires particular attention. This is because at the re-
recruitment stage, the former combatant is somebody who has 
experienced violence as an instigator, and this experience is valuable to 
radical groups. However, as argued within the push and pull factors 
framework, the agency of former combatant would become a risk for 
security if there are fertile conditions and interests for their recruitment. 
This involves the role of intermediaries, conflict entrepreneurs, and 
organizers of violence. Nevertheless, in conceptualizing the relationship 
between the presence of radical groups and former combatants who are 
not fully reintegrated into post-conflict society, it is important to 
construct it as a cumulative interaction rather than a causal one.
Rather than considering the failure of reintegration programs as the main 
cause of re-recruitment into radicalization, it would be much more effec-
tive to consider how failings in reintegration would feed into the existing 
push and pull factors of a particular society. In the event of recruitment 
into a radical group, the outcome of reintegration programs and existing 
push and pull factors feed into each other. For example, in post-conflict 
Liberia, thousands of former child soldiers roam the streets of Monrovia, 
homeless, unemployed, and frustrated. Although some of them are 
involved in petty crime, they are not yet considered a security threat for 
radicalization at the national and international levels. This is because 
there is no radical group or organization at the local or regional level 
actively engaged in recruitment. However, this is not true in other con-
texts, such as Mindanao in the Philippines, Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, 
and possibly now in the Middle East and North Africa region in relation to 
the impact of the recent "Arab Spring." Furthermore, it is important to 
note that the successful reintegration of child soldiers is not adequate to 
prevent them from being radicalized in the future. Past grievances can be 
a lingering yet significant factor in joining an extremist group.
Therefore, in order to reduce the likeliness of re-recruitment by radical 
groups, it is necessary to consider three fundamental principles. First, the 
reintegration of child soldiers and youth should be seen as part and parcel 
of their families and communities, and consequently, address one of the 
major push and pull factors that play a role in such recruitment. Second, 
the issue of reintegration should be seen through a political lens rather 
than a purely technical one. The power dynamics of finding a social and 
political role for former combatants in post-conflict environments is if not 
more, at least as important as the opportunities of employment and edu-
cation. Finally, the risk of radicalization and involvement in violent 
extremism is ultimately a structural challenge, and its main causes should 
be sought in the bigger picture of macro-level economics, politics, and 
international relations. In other words, rather than trying to find a solu-
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tion to the manifestation of a phenomenon through a band-aid approach 
and seeing war-affected youth from a purely security perspective, the 
approach should start with questioning and addressing the macro-level 
structural dynamics.
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